Michigan Law Review
Volume 53

Issue 7

1955

Legislation - Application of Merchantile License Tax to Lawyers
Edward H. Hoenicke
University of Michigan Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Commercial Law Commons, Legal Profession Commons, Legislation Commons, TaxationFederal Commons, and the Tax Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Edward H. Hoenicke, Legislation - Application of Merchantile License Tax to Lawyers, 53 MICH. L. REV.
1008 (1955).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol53/iss7/18

This Recent Important Decisions is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law
Review by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

1008

MmmGAN LAw REvmw

[ Vol. 53

LEGISLATION-APPLICATION OF MERCANTILE LICENSE TAX TO LAWYERS--

The Philadelphia City Council passed an ordinance entitled "AN ORDINANCETo provide for revenue by imposing a mercantile license tax on persons en-
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gaging in certain businesses including manufacturing, professions, occupations,
trades, vocations, and commercial activities in the City of Philadelphia. • . ."
Under this ordinance the city required lawyers to register, pay a registration fee,
and pay a tax on a percentage of their gross volume of business; thereupon,
"mercantile licenses" were issued to them. The city charter required each
ordinance to deal with one subject only and to express that subject in the title.
The application of the ordinance to lawyers was attacked under the sponsorship
of the Philadelphia Bar Association, and the lower court enjoined enforcement
against lawyers. On appeal, held, reversed. Sterling v. Philadelphia, 378 Pa.
538, 106 A (2d) 793 (1954).
The taxation of lawyers for revenue purposes is not an unconstitutional invasion of the judicial sphere by the legislative branch of government.1 It is
reasoned that lawyers as citizens must bear their fair share of the tax burden
along with all others.2 In this context, the lawyer is not considered an "officer
of the court" or a "public official."3 The power in the judiciary to set the
qualifications for the bar does not preclude the legislature from taxing members
of the bar; in fact, historically, the very status of "attorney" was created by
statute.4 Today, the power to license attorneys is upheld if the licensing is interpreted as a revenue and not a regulatory measure.5 The power of a municipality to levy taxes is derived from the power of the state by direct grant,6 by the
terms of a municipal charter,7 or by implication from the absence of a statute
prohibiting municipal taxation. 8
The particular ordinance presents problems because of two provisions:
the charter limitation that a bill must embody only one subject which, in turn,
must be expressed "clearly and adequately" in its title,9 and the provision of
the Pennsylvania Statutory Construction Act directing that tax measures be
1 Goldthwaite v. City Council of Montgomecy, 50 Ala. 486 (1874); Lister v. City of
Fort Smith, 199 Ark. 492, 134 S.W. (2d) 535 (1939); 16 A.L.R. (2d) 1228 (1951).
2 4 CooLEY, THELA.w OF TAXATION, 4th ed., §1704, p. 3415 (1924).
3 In re Galusha, 184 Cal. 697, 195 P. 406 (1921); Newlin v. Stuart, 273 Ky. 626,
117 S.W. (2d) 608 (1938). It has been held that an attomey is not an officer of the state
in the sense that his actions are not to be regarded as "state action" for purposes of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Berg v. Cranor, (9th Cir. 1954) 209 F. (2d) 567.
4 C1wm, A HISTORY oF ENGLISH LA.w 351 (1831); Lee, ''The Constitutional Power
of the Courts Over Admission to the Bar," 13 HARv. L. REv. 233 at 238 (1899).
5 In re Johnson, 47 Cal. App. 465, 190 P. 852 (1920); McCarthy v. Tucson, 26
Ariz. 311, 225 P. 329 (1924). A license tax on lawyers was held invalid in Hill v. City
of Eureka, 35 Cal. App. (2d) 154, 94 P. (2d) 1025 (1939). See also 1912A Ann. Cas. 597.
The many cases on this point tum not only on the unique wording of the particular statutes
involved, but also upon the courts' willingness or reluctance to accept the purpose of the
measures as stated by the legislatures. Of course, even a tax for revenue purposes may
be so exorbitant as to be unreasonable and confiscatory. Newlin v. Stuart, note 3 supra.
The cases are split on whether the payment of the tax can be made a condition precedent
to practicing law. Wright v. Atlanta, 54 Ga. 645 (1875); Shepherd v. Little Rock, 183
Ark. 244, 35 S.W. (2d) 361 (1931).
6Davis v. Ogden City, 117 Utah 315, 215 P. (2d) 616 (1950).
7 Abraham v. City of Rosenberg, 55 Ore. 359, 105 P. 401 (1909).
s Barrett v. State, 44 Ariz. 270, 36 P. (2d) 260 (1934).
9 Philadelphia Home Rule Charter, §2-201, approved April 17, 1951.
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strictly construed.10 One of the primary purposes of the title limitation is to
insure that notice of the legislation is given the public. Although such limitations often are liberally construed,11 no state constitution has a provision which
goes so far as to demand that the subject be "clearly and adequately" expressed.12 Adding to the strictness of the language in the charter the fact that
a city council is a lesser political organ, it can be argued that this title provision
was meant to be more strictly construed. Unless the word "mercantile" be
regarded as surplusage, the title does not give notice to lawyers that the ordinance
applies to them. If the word "mercantile" is ignored, what remains is an ordinance which authorizes the city to tax everything.13 Such an ordinance would
_be beyond the power of the city of Philadelphia,14 although the severability
clause could be used by the courts to cut down the scope of the ordinance to
conform to the limits of municipal power. It seems more consistent with the
aims of good government, however, to presume that the council intended the
word mercantile to have its traditional meaning, thereby limiting the tax, than
to presume that it intended to pass an omnibus bill and depend upon the courts
to delineate it. The majority of the court, however, felt that the intent of the
council was clear, notwithstanding its designation of the measure as a mercantile
license tax.15 The point which is of ~oncem to lawyers, and which provoked
Justice Musmanno's sharp dissent, is the clear implication of the court's holding:
if the license tax is applicable to lawyers, and if the ordinance conforms to the
mechanical requirements of title, then the practice of law is a business of a
mercantile character. This is a dramatic departure from the attitude of several
centuries of lawyers-and non-lawyers. 16 The result may reflect a general
10 Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1952) tit. 46, §558, held applicable to municipal corporations in Breitinger v. Philadelphia, 363 Pa. 512, 70 A. (2d) 640 (1950).
llSUTHBBLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCI'ION, 3d ed., §1704 (1943).
12 Twenty-three states say merely that the subject or object of the law shall be "expressed" in the title: Amz. CoNsT., art. 4, §13; CAL. CoNsT., art. IV, §24; DBL. CoNST.,
art. 2, §16; GA. CoNST., art. III, §VII, c. 2-19, §2-1908; IDAHO CONST., art. 3, §16; Ir.r..
CoNST., art. IV, §13; IND. CoNsT., art. 4, §19; IowA CoNST., art. 3, §29; KY. CoNsT.,
§51; Ml:cH. CoNsT., art. V, §21; MINN. CoNST., art. 4, §27; N.J. CONST., art. 4, §7, ,r4;
N.Y. CONST., art. 3, §15; N.D. CONST., art. II, §61; Oro!. CONST., art. IV, §20; s.c.
CoNsT., art. 3, §17; S.D. CoNST., art. III, §21; TENN. CoNsT., art. 2, §17; Tm:. CoNST.,
art. 3, §35; VA. CONST., art. IV, §52; WASH. CONST., art. 2, §19; W.VA. CONST., art.
VI, §30; Wis. CoNsT., art IV, §18. Twelve states require that the subject be "clearly
expressed": ALA. CoNST., art 4, §45; CoLo. CoNsT., art. V, §21; KAN. CONST., art. 2,
§16; Mo. CONST., art. 3, §23; MoNT. CoNsT., art. V, §23; NEB. CoNST., art. III, §14;
N.M. CoNST., art. IV, §16; Omo CoNsT., art. II, §16; OKLA. CoNsT., art. 5, §57; PA.
CoNST., art. 3, §3; UTAH CoNsT., art. VI, §23; WYo. CoNsT., art. 3, §24. Two states
require that the subject be ''brieHy expressed": FLA. CoNsT., art. III, §16; NBv. CONST.,
art. IV, §68; and one state each requires that the subject be "indicated": LA. CoNST., art.
3, §16; "described": MD. CoNST,, art. 3, §29; and "indicate clearly'': Miss. CoNsT., art.
4, §71.
13 In fact, in Philadelphia it has been called the ''Tax Everything Act."
14 Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1954) tit. 53, §§2015.1 to 2015.8.
15 Principal case at 794.
16 Pound, ''What Is a Profession? The Rise of the Legal Profession in Antiquity," 19
NoTRB DAME LAWYER 203 (1944).
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opinion of society which, in mid-twentieth century, allegedly17 finds little distinction ~tween the practice of law and the operation of a mercantile business.
It is to be hoped that, tax or no tax, Philadelphia lawyers continue to adhere to
standards well above those of the market place.
Edward H. Hoenicke

17Gossett,

(1953).

"Human Rights and the American Bar," 22
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